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In this study we examine the dividend behaviour of Indian companies. We use GMM 
estimator, which is the most suitable methodology in a dynamic setting. Our results 
show that the Indian firms have lower target ratios and higher adjustment factors. The 
most significant result is that the restricted monetary policies have significant influence 
on the dividend behaviour of Indian firms, causing about 5-6 percent reduction in the 
payout ratios. The significance of macro economic policy variable suggest that 
monetary policy restrictions do have impact on cost of raising funds, and the 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers increases that forces companies 
to reduce their dividend payout.   
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Dividend Behaviour of Indian Companies 
Under Monetary Policy Restrictions 
 
 
he study of corporate dividend behaviour has been a key research area in finance. 
Yet we still do not have an acceptable explanation for the observed dividend 
behaviour of companies and the ‘dividend puzzle’ still remains unsolved (Black, 1976). 
Under the assumption that capital markets are perfect, the finance researchers have 
shown that dividends are irrelevant, and that they have no influence on the share price 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961). When capital markets are imperfect, some researchers 
have argued that dividends do matter and firms pursue an appropriate dividend policy.  
Several empirical surveys indicate that both managers and investors favour payment of 
dividends. Lintner (1956) was the first to point out that US companies distributed a 
large part of their earnings as dividends, and they also attempted to maintain stability of 
dividend. These findings have been vindicated in different countries and in different 
time periods.  
The focus of this research is to examine the dividend behaviour of the listed firms in 
India - an emerging market in Asia. In emerging markets, including India, the central 
banks frequently use monetary policies as a control mechanism. Sometimes they follow 
highly restrictive policies, which affect the liquidity position in the economy. Hence in 
this study, we focus on the impact of the restricted monetary policy on the dividend 
policies of Indian firms. This study provides evidence that the listed Indian firms follow 
less stable dividend policies and their dividend payments are significantly affected by the 
restricted monetary policy of the government. To our knowledge this is a first study 
providing evidence of the restricted monetary policy constraining the dividend policies 
of firms in India.  
The organisation of the article is as follows. The next section reviews some important 
previous studies abroad and in India. The third section describes the model and 
methodology and in the fourth section, we discuss the sample and data. In the fifth 
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section, we present results and the last section contains the main conclusions of the 
study.  
Literature review  
Here we briefly focus on the empirical studies that deal with the dividend paying 
behaviour of firms. Lintner (1956) uncovered for the first time that firms in USA 
maintained a target dividend payout ratio and adjusted their dividend policy to this 
target. The long-term sustainable investment and growth objectives determined the 
firms’ target payout ratios. Further, Lintner found that firms pursued a stable dividend 
policy and gradually increased dividends given the target payout ratio. This implies that 
firms set speed to move towards the full achievement of payout. These findings suggest 
that firms establish their dividends in accordance with the level of current earnings as 
well as dividend of the previous year. Lintner also pointed out that managers believe 
that investors prefer firms with stable dividend policies. 
A number of surveys and empirical studies have been conducted in USA and other 
countries using Lintner’s framework. In USA, Darling (1957), Fama and Babiak (1968), 
and Brittain (1966) use modified and extended Lintner model to confirm his findings. A 
survey of the NYSE-listed companies by Baker et. al.  (1985) support the Lintner 
findings, and they conclude that the major determinants of dividend payments are 
future earnings and past dividends. The subsequent survey study of Pruitt and Gitman 
(1991) also confirms these results.  
Lintner’s model has been generally found applicable in a number of other developed 
markets. It has been tested by Chateau (1979) in Canada, Shevin (1982) in Australia, 
McDonald et. al. (1975) in France, Leithner and Zimmermann (1993) in West Germany, 
UK, France and Switzerland and Lasfer (1996) in UK. Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
compare dividend policies of firms in USA and Japan for the period from 1982 to 1993. 
Their results show that U.S.A firms tend to choose stable dividend policies whereas 
Japanese firms prefer to omit dividend and follow relatively unstable dividend policies.    5
Researchers have recently started looking at the dividend behaviour of companies in 
regulated and emerging markets. Glen et. al. (1995) find substantial differences in 
dividend policies of companies in developed and emerging markets. They show that 
dividend payments are much lower in emerging markets, and firms follow less stable 
dividend policies, although they do have target payout ratios.  
Ariff and Johnson (1994) confirm Lintner’s model for firms in Singapore. In Turkey, 
Adaoglu (2000) finds that current earnings are the main determinant of dividend 
payments. After deregulation of distribution of profits in Turkey in 1994, when firms 
were given the flexibility of choosing their own dividend policy, they followed unstable 
dividend policies. A study of the dividend behaviour the listed Malaysian companies 
(Pandey, 2003) shows that payout ratios vary across industries and time. The results also 
reveal that the dividend behaviour of the Malaysian companies is sensitive to the 
changes in earnings. Further, using Lintner’s framework and panel regression 
methodology, the study finds evidence of less stable dividend policies being pursued by 
the Malaysian companies. The results of the two-way fixed effects model reveal strong 
individual firm and time effects.  
In India several studies have been conducted using the Lintner framework. A study by 
Bhat and Pandey (1994) in India supports the Lintner findings and reveals that Indian 
managers confirm that companies maintain an uninterrupted record of dividend 
payments and also try to avoid abrupt changes in their dividend policies. 
What are the explanations for the firms’ dividend payment behaviour? There are several 
explanations, but three most important include: agency problem and corporate control, 
signalling and tax. Dividend payments potentially mitigate agency problems 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). From the point of view of the corporate governance 
and control, dividend payments may be customised to attract large institutional 
investors who can effectively monitor the corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000). The signalling explanation based on the 
asymmetric information implies that steady dividend payments provide signal about the 
firm’s performance that is not conveyed by the financial reports and other disclosures.   6
The prediction under the signalling hypothesis is the same as under the corporate 
control. Finally, the taxes might influence dividends paying behaviour of firms. Under 
current Indian law, individual shareholders do not pay any tax on dividend incomes, 
while they are taxed for realised capital gains. Instead of the investors, companies have 
to pay tax on the distributed incomes. This raises the effective corporate tax rates for 
the dividend paying companies. Thus the current tax laws may encourage dividend 
payments. However, this has not always been the case in India. In the past, dividends 
were taxed at the marginal personal tax rates. The essential point is that the high taxes 
on individuals’ dividend income may discourage the payment of dividends. 
Model and methodology 
The Lintner dividend model has been most often used as an empirical framework to 
describe the determinants of dividend payment behaviour of firms.  We also follow the 
Lintner framework. However, in this study our main motivation is to find out the 
dividend paying behaviour of Indian firms subject to the monetary policy restrictions. 
What is the relationship between the dividends and the restricted monetary policies? 
We shall draw from Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) to show the implications of the 
monetary policy restrictions on the dividend payout policy.  In Figure 1, F is the 
amount of internal funds and S1 is its cost of funds schedule.  The cost of these internal 
funds is a risk-adjusted cost including a risk-free rate (rf) – an outcome of monetary 
policy variables and common for all firms and risk premium (φ) - risk adjusted for the 
company under consideration.  Under perfect capital markets, the cost of internal and 
external funds would be the same; that is, r1 rate. However, when markets are not 
perfect, there are more chances of a firm defaulting on its debt due to moral hazard 
problem resulting from information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Hence 
S1 rises beyond F – the internal funds. The upward shift in the curve is also caused by the 
changes in risk-free rate caused by the monetary policy changes. This would reduce the 
value of the borrower’s collateral, and consequently, increase moral hazard problem 
(Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). Thus, there is a linkage between the risk premium and 
the macro-economic policies.  Hence, this leads to shift in the schedule from S1 to S2.     7
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Figure 1 (Adapted from Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996) 
 
After the monetary policy restrictions, the cost of external finances relative to internal 
funds increases.  This shift in relative finance costs would cause shifts in investments.  
The amount of investments would be subject to the availability of internal funds and 
would be sensitive to such changes after monetary policy restrictions.  As a result, in 
order to ensure availability of cheaper internal funds firms may first alter their dividend 
payout before raising the external funds.  Under capital market imperfections, the effect 
of restrictive monetary policy would be significant under monetary tightening than 
during normal times.  There would be shift in availability from F to F΄ thereby 
increasing availability of funds from I2 to I˝2.  This rise in cost of funds would have 
implications for the investments that fall from I1 to I2.  Capital market imperfections 
magnify any macroeconomic shocks that affect borrowers’ moral hazard (Stiglitz 1992). 
This is the reason why new supply schedule is S2 and not S΄1.  The restrictive monetary 
policy intensifies the effect on the cost of debt and external financing by pushing it up 
and increasing the spread at various levels of financial requirements. 
Given the implications of monetary policy restrictions on availability of funds to meet 
firm’s requirements, we expand the Lintner framework to examine the impact of these 
restrictions on dividend policy of companies.  Our hypothesis is that during the 
monetary policy restrictions the dividend payout policy of firms change and the   8
payouts are less.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2002), based on the Lintner model, provide a 
useful framework for analysing the dividend paying behaviour of firms.  This 
framework explicitly accounts for the cost of deviating from the target payout ratio and 
the cost of deviating from the previous year’s dividend.  In this framework, the target 
payout is likely to be a function of the macro-economic policy.  From the basic Lintner 
model, Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) derive the following equation: 
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In this equation, Ψ is the total cost of paying dividend, kit is the target payout ratio and 
Eit is the earnings in period t, Dit is dividend paid in period t and Dit-1 is dividend paid in 
the past year. The aim of a firm should be to minimise Ψ in deciding its dividend policy. 
Notice that the above specification is quadratic.  This implies that the costs of paying 
dividend are symmetric around earnings and previous period’s dividends and γ1 and γ2 
both are greater than 0.  
We are not aware of any study that examines the impact of macro-economic variables 
on the dividend payout (kit).  As argued above, the dividend payout influences a firm’s 
financing; hence the macro-economic variables such as interest rate or cost of capital 
would be relevant. The impact of the macro-economic variables may assume greater 
significance in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  
In the presence of information asymmetry lenders incur costs in evaluating projects, and 
monitoring and enforcing outcomes. Hence, to compensate for these costs, providers of 
all types of external finance charge some premium over the cost of finance in 
comparison to the cost of internal funds (Gertler 1988).  To describe these relationships 
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The parameters [γ1 / γ1 + γ2] in above equation depict the speed of adjustment.  Since the 
coefficients of kit Eit and Dit-1 are constrained to sum to one it is possible to estimate the   9
value of kit.  While estimating the model, we also release the constraint restricting the 
influence of past dividends to only one lag and extend estimations to two lags as 
suggested in Lehmann and Mody (2004).  They also suggest considering the possibility 
of asymmetric response of dividends to positive and negative income changes.  When 
there is positive movement in earnings, there is more flexibility with the managers to 
increase dividends whereas the same is not the case when earnings decline.  In that case 
the equation becomes: 


























=           (3) 
In above equation E
+ is earnings that have increased compared to that in the last period, 
with E
- equal to zero in that period and conversely for E
-.  Further, α and β are the 
weights accorded respectively to the first and second lag of dividends and add up to one. 
Finally, we consider the impact of monetary restriction in the above specifications 
[Equation (3)]. We use dummy variable to represent the monetary restriction (MR). 
MRt is dummy variable assuming value 1 in monetary restricted year and 0 when there 
is no monetary restriction.  Thus, our empirical model is as follows:  
it t i 2 it t 5
1 it t 4 2 it 3 1 it 2 it 1 0 it
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−
− − −      (4) 
The impact of monetary restriction on dividend payout can be worked out in the 
following manner: 
Dividend payout in normal year:  ( ) 3 2 1 t 1 k λ − λ − λ =     
Dividend payout in restricted year:  ( ) 5 4 3 2 1 t 1 k λ − λ − λ − λ − λ =  
Our estimation model [Equation (4)] uses panel data. Panel data, unlike cross-section or 
time series data, allows controlling for unobservable heterogeneity through individual 
(firm) effect (ϕi). We also include dummies for time variable to measure temporal effect 
(φt). This helps in controlling the general effect of all other macro-economic variables.   10
Pooling of time-series cross-sectional data provides more observations, more variability, 
less collinearity among variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 
1995, p. 3-6). More importantly, pooled data are more proficient to identify and 
measure effects that are undetectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
Moreover, the measurement biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals 
and biases arising from omitted-variables are reduced (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, 
p.250). The merit of a panel data over cross-section data is the ease of modelling the 
differences in behaviour across individuals (Greene 2003). Moreover, it is only through 
the panel data analysis it is possible to examine the effect of monetary policy restrictions 
of several years and the dynamics of change in dividend payouts effectively.   
Sample and data 
The source of the data used in the study is the CMIE (Centre for the Monitoring of the 
Indian Economy) Prowess database.  The sample includes all firms in the manufacturing 
sector for which the annualised data for all the years starting from 1989 to 1997 were 
available. We have restricted our sample until the year 1997 because of the relative 
consistency of the tax policy with regard to dividends and capital gains. After 1997, 
there was substantial change in the policy of taxing dividends and capital gains. Hence, 
to avoid the estimation complication of the unknown bias, we have not considered 
years beyond 1997. Further, in order to avoid the bias arising from the very small firms 
in the sample, we excluded the firms for which the average net sales for the sample 
period were less than Rs. 100 million. We also excluded firms with missing data for two 
or more consecutive years, with negative net worth and those without the dividend 
information up to two lag periods.  Our final sample consists of data for 571 firms. We 
have constructed a balanced data panel of the Indian firms. In our estimations, we used 
lags of dividends up to two periods. Thus our panel observations are 3997. Data for all 
firms with accounting year ending from any month during October to September have 
been considered as the data falling in one-year category.  
In estimation models, variables include dividends, earnings and an interaction variable 
equal to the product of monetary restriction (MR) and lagged dividends. MR is a   11
dummy variable; in periods of restrictive monetary policy, MR assumes a value of one, 
otherwise zero. Our dependent variable is dividends in the current year (Dt). Earnings 
(Et) are net profits after taxes. E
+ (earnings plus) denotes earnings that have increased 
over that in the previous period and E
- (earnings minus) in that period will be zero.  
And in the same way, E
- denotes earnings that have decreased over that in the previous 
period with E
+ equal to zero in that period. It is difficult to clearly identify the stance of 
monetary policy with a single indicator. Hence, we didn’t use bank rate, lending rate, or 
the interest rate spreads as parameters for identifying the restrictive policy years. 
Instead, we used the Reserve Bank of India’s Economic Survey Reports as a base to 
identify the restrictive years. Beginning from 1991 to 2002, only two years could be 
clearly identified as restrictive years.  They are years 1991-92 and 1996-97.  For example, 
the Economic Survey of 1992 states that the stance of monetary policy in 1991-92 was 
highly restrictive in order to contain the growth of aggregate demand to fight the twin 
problems of high inflation and adverse balance of payments. Further, the Economic 
Survey states that during 1996-1997 the bank lending rates remained sticky for 
sometime despite the increased liquidity with the banks following cash credit ratio 
(CRR) reductions. Banks did not reduce interest rates immediately in order to avoid a 
dent in the interest rate spread that would have affected profits adversely. With inflation 
falling sharply, real interest rates rose, contributing to lower demand for credit.  
Though nominal interest rates fell during the 1996-97 period, real interest rates rose 
during this period because of falling inflation rates. 
Results  
Table 1 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, maximum and 
minimum) of earnings and dividends and mean payout ratios. Both mean earnings and 
dividends have increased over years. The standard deviations have also risen. The gaps 
between minimum and maximum earnings are quite large; the minimum earrings are 
negative in each year.  The average payout, except for two-three years, has varied within 
a narrow range.   12
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
  Earnings (Rs. in millions)  Dividends (Rs. in millions) 
Year Mean Stdev Max Min Mean  Stdev  Max  Min 
Payout  
(%) 
1989 37  114  1549  -340  13  41  609  0 36 
1990 52  127  1185  -187  17  47  506  0 34 
1991 65  155  1513  -180  21  57  713  0 33 
1992 72  191  2090  -359  25  68  806  0 34 
1993 65  211  3194  -576  29  80  848  0 44 
1994 107  312  5052  -374 40  113  1384  0 38 
1995 189  607  10086  -292 56  157  1993  0 30 
1996 250  836  12809  -578 68  201  2762  0 27 
1997 223  846  12797  -1464 71  233  2992  0 32 
All   118  479  12809  -1464  38  131  2992  0 32 
 
Table 2 displays the results of the two-way fixed effects models. We have estimated four 
models. Model 1 includes current earnings, lagged dividend and monetary restrictions 
interaction variables as independent variables. Model 3 has t-1 and t-2 lagged dividends 
and the associated monetary restriction interaction variable as additional independent 
variables.  Models 2 and 4 introduce positive and negative movements in earnings as 
independent variables.  
Table 2:  Two-way Fixed Effects Model 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4    
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
Constant  0.527
*  3.55 0.378
* 3.71  0.734
*  4.44 0.564
* 4.03 
D-1  0.720
*  12.39 0.798
* 16.07  0.707
*  6.42 0.777
* 7.85 
D-2            -0.025  -0.28 -0.013  -0.18 
MR1  -0.032  -0.98 -0.085
* -4.14  0.417
*  2.07 0.365
* 2.00 
MR2            -0.632
*  -2.47 -0.623
* -2.54 
E  0.092
*  18.94       0.089
*  13.71      
E
-       0.057
* 7.87     0.056
* 5.29 
E
+       0.093
* 12.68     0.089
* 11.3 
                    
Adj. R
2  0.946     0.949     0.950   0.953     
F-statistic  139.36
*     146.72
*     132.68
*   138.76
*    
Hausman  281.13
*     233.95
*     320.60
*     278.10
*    
Payout  E   E
+ E
-  E   E
+ E
- 
Normal  33%     46%  28%  28%   38% 24% 
Restricted  29%     32%  20%  17%     18%  11% 
Notes:  
1.  t-stats are White heteroskedasticity corrected estimates 
2.  Significant at 1% level of significance 
3.  Significant Hausman statistic rejects REM in favour of FEM 
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The two-way fixed effects control for unobservable characteristics that might influence 
dividend policy. The Lintner specification fits the data quite well. The regression 
coefficients of current earnings, Et and lagged dividends, Dt-1 depict right signs and are 
statistically significant. The generally higher coefficients and the associated t-statistics of 
Dt-1 imply the greater importance of past dividend in deciding the dividend payment. 
The signs of coefficients of lagged dividends Dt-2 are negative, but they are not 
statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on lagged dividends in the four 
models range from 0.70 to 0.78. This implies adjustment parameters ranging from 0.22 
to 0.30. The companies’ desired payout ratio is given by the ratio of the estimated 
coefficient on earnings and the estimated adjustment parameter. Thus the desired 
payout ratios vary from 24 percent to 46 percent. The coefficients of the monetary 
restriction-lagged dividends interaction variables are statistically significant. The test for 
the possibility of asymmetric response of dividends to positive and negative movements 
in earnings shows that the increased earnings lead to increased dividend payout and the 
reduced earnings to lower dividend payments. The monetary restrictions have a much 
larger effect on payout ratios when we consider changes in earnings. The statistically 
significant Hausman statistic in all models favours the fixed effects model over the 
random effects model (REM). 
The fixed effects estimator controls for unobservable heterogeneity. But the 
specification in Equation (4) is a dynamic model. A dynamic model with lagged 
dependent variable as independent variable causes considerable difficulty in estimation. 
The error term may be auto-correlated; but more seriously, the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term when we use fixed or random effects models 
(Greene, 2003). The literature has suggested the use of instrumental variables (IV) 
estimators and the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in estimation of 
dynamic models. Here to avoid the problems of heterogeneity and the biases caused by 
the lagged dependent variable, we use the GMM procedure based on Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM estimator uses instrument variables. 
In our estimations, we use as instruments all the right-hand side variables and their one-
lagged values. The results of the GMM estimator based on Arellano and Bover (1995)   14
are given in Table 3.  Estimation based on Arellano and Bover (1995) uses orthogonal 
deviations and it removes the individual effects. 
Table 3 shows results of four estimation models. The estimated coefficients on lagged 
dividends in the four models vary from 0.21 to 0.31. In Model 1 it is 0.29. This implies 
that Indian companies pay dividends with adjustment parameters equal to (1 – 0.29) = 
0.71. The desired payout ratio is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on 
earnings (0.18) and the estimated adjustment parameter –the implied desired payout 
ratio is (0.18/0.71), or 25 percent. The coefficient of the monetary restriction-lagged 
dividends interaction variable, MR1 (MRt*Dt-1) appears with a negative sign and it is 
statistically significant. Hence, the monetary restriction-lagged dividends interaction 
variable causes reduction in dividend payments. The desired restricted payout ratio 
reduces by 3 percent to 22 percent. In Model 2, we test for the possibility of asymmetric 
response of dividends to increases and decreases in earnings. We do find some evidence 
of the positive earnings changes leading to increased dividend payout and the negative 
earnings leading to reduced dividend payments. The payout ratio is 26 percent when 
earrings changes are positive and 25 percent when they are negative. The monetary 
restrictions reduce payout by 3 percent both under positive and negative changes in 
earnings. 
Table 3:  Panel Generalized Method of Moments (Orthogonal Deviations) 
variables  coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat 
D-1   0.290
*   23.91   0.311
*   19.79  0.208
*  14.21 0.220
* 14.06 
D-2             0.116
*  6.34 0.115
* 6.32 
MR1  -0.095
*  -15.46 -0.107
* -16.29  0.307
*  14.74 0.296
* 13.62 
MR2            -0.544
*  -19.76 -0.543
* -18.64 
E   0.180
*   38.68        0.171
*  31.36      
E
-        0.182
*   42.68      0.167
* 21.58 
E
+         0.172
*   30.86       0.173
* 28.59 
R
2  0.768     0.771     0.765     0.766    
Adj. R
2  0.768     0.771     0.765     0.766    
Sargan stat.  37.22     36.65     31.95     32.02    
p-value  0.241     0.223     0.519     0.231    
Observations  3997     3997     3426     3426    
   E   E
+ E
-  E   E
+ E
- 
Payout                
Normal  25%   25%  26% 25%   26%  25% 
Restricted  22%     22%  23%  19%     19%  18%   15
Notes: 
1.  t-stats are White heteroskedasticity corrected estimates 
2.  * Significant at 1% level of significance 
3.  The instruments include independent variables and one lagged values.  
4.  Sargan’s statistic is a specification test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests for the 
absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
 
In Models 3 and 4 we release the constraint restricting the influence of past dividends to 
only one lag and extend the analysis to two lags. In Model 4, we also consider the 
asymmetric response of dividends to positive and negative changes in earnings. Though 
the coefficients of the two-year lagged dividends are statistically significant, yet the 
normal desired payout does not change. However, the monetary restrictions interacting 
with one-year lag and two-year lag dividends cause larger reduction in the desired 
payout ratios; the reduction is about 5-6 percent.  
We also make estimations using model Arellano and Bond (1991).  In Table 4, we 
present results based on the first differences method, as suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). The results are very similar to the results obtained using Arellano and Bover 
(1995) model. Thus our methodology is robust and we obtain consistent results. 
Overall, we find that there is strong evidence that Indian firms always consider dividend 
paid in the past two years as important benchmark for deciding the current dividend 
payment. Further, the high adjustment factors together with low payout ratios indicate 
that the Indian firms frequently change their dividend payments, and dividend 
smoothing is of a lower order. There is also evidence of the asymmetric response to 
dividends to increase and decrease in earnings; firms pay more dividends when their 
earnings increase. The most interesting finding of the study is that the restricted 
monetary policies cause reduction in dividend payments of Indian firms. The restricted 
monetary policies constrain the flow of funds in the economy that has its impact of the 
dividend paying behaviour of the firms.  
Table 4:  Panel Generalized Method of Moments (First Difference) 
variables  coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat coef.  t-stat 
D-1  0.290
*  23.50 0.319
* 20.04 0.207
*  14.64 0.226
* 14.31 
D-2            0.125
*  7.07 0.123
* 6.90 
MR1  -0.094
*  -15.20 -0.111
* -16.32  0.251
*  10.76 0.238
* 10.10   16
MR2            -0.473
*  -16.13 -0.472
* -15.65 
E  0.183
*  38.73       0.172
*  33.39      
E
-       0.184
* 43.13       0.166
* 23.72 
E
+        0.171
* 30.63        0.174
* 32.09 
R
2  0.281     0.268     0.353     0.343    
Adj. R
2  0.281     0.268     0.352     0.342    
J-stat  37.18     36.75     32.42     32.41    
p-value  0.282     0.220     0.258     0.212    
Observations  3997     3997     3426     3426    
Payout   E   E
+ E
-  E   E
+ E
- 
Normal  26%   25%  27%  26%   27%  25% 
Restricted  23%     22%  23%  19%     20%  19% 
Notes: 
1.  t-stats are White heteroskedasticity corrected estimates 
2.  * Significant at 1% level of significance 
3.  The instruments include independent variables and one lagged values.  
4.  J-statistic is a specification test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests for the 
absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
Conclusion  
In this study we examined the dividend behaviour of Indian companies. Do Indian firms 
follow stable dividend policies? How do the monetary policy restrictions affect the 
dividend payouts of the firm? We use Lintner’s model to test for dividend stability of 
firms in India. We discard the results of the two-way fixed effects model, as it does not 
provide appropriate estimations in a dynamic setting. Hence we use GMM estimator, 
which accounts for heterogeneity and is most suitable in a dynamic setting. Our results 
establish the validity of the Lintner model in the emerging Indian market, and prove the 
underlying dynamic relationship between current dividends as dependent variable and 
current earnings and past dividends as independent variables. Further, our results also 
show that the Indian firms have lower target ratios and higher adjustment factors. This 
points the low smoothing and instability of dividend policies in India. The most 
noteworthy finding is that the restricted monetary policies have significant influence on 
the dividend payout behaviour of Indian firms; they cause about 5-6 percent reduction 
in the payout ratios. The significance of macro economic policy variable suggest that 
monetary restrictions do have impact on cost of raising funds and information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers increases thereby forcing the companies to 
reduce their dividend payout.  These findings of this paper suggest that macro-economic 
policies have impact on corporate financing decisions.  The future research should   17
examine the impact of various other macro-economic policies on the corporate 
financing decisions of firms. 
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